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Dealing with deductive reasoning, performed by ‘real-life’ reasoners and 
expressed in natural language, the paper confronts Harman’s denying of 
normative relevance of logic to reasoning with a logicist thesis, a princi-
ple that is supposed to contribute for solving the problem of incongruence 
between descriptive nature of logic and normativity of reasoning. The 
paper discusses in detail John MacFarlane’s (2004) and Hartry Field’s 
(2009) variants of “bridge principle”. Taking both variants of bridge 
principles as its starting point, the paper proceeds arguing that there 
is more than one logical formalism that can be normatively suitable for 
deductive reasoning, due to the fact that reasoning can assume different 
forms that are guided by different goals. A particular reasoning process-
ing can be modelled by specifi c formalism that can be shown to be actu-
ally used by a real human agent in a real reasoning context.
Keywords: Logic, real-life reasoning, normativity, deductive rea-
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1. Introduction
The paper deals with the normativity of reasoning, specifi cally with de-
ductive reasoning, performed by ‘real-life’ reasoners and expressed in 
natural language. Deductive reasoning in a ‘real-life’ situation might 
seem as a kind of oxymoron. If reasoning is deductive it seems that it 
should be in accord with the rules of deductive logic. As it is well empiri-
cally documented, everyday reasoning can hardly satisfy deductive log-
ic’s standards. The question of normativity I am interested in is wheth-
er formal logic, or at least a kind of formal logic, can still have a decisive 
1 The writing of this paper was supported by the Croatian Science Foundation 
under the grant number IP-06-2016-2408.
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normative implication for reasoning. Why is this question important? It 
is important due to the fact that a drastic denial of normative impact 
of logic to reasoning leaves us without the safe criteria of normativity. 
We are in this case left only with the appeal to intuitions that are sup-
posed to be the arbiter of correctness of reasoning. On the other hand, if 
there is a plausible theoretical connection between logic and reasoning, 
whereas logic can also be of non-classical, even non-monotonic kind, our 
understanding of reasoning will be on a much fi rmer ground.
The problems for applying normativity of logic to reasoning, in the 
formal setting, are in their sharpest form stated by Harman (1986). He 
famously proclaimed the independence of logic to reasoning arguing 
that there is a huge gap between logic that describes the relation of im-
plication and the normativity of reasoning that has to do with what we 
should believe. However, this paper is defending the logicist thesis. The 
logicist thesis is the claim that there is, to use MacFarlane’s formula-
tion: “some connection between logical validity and the evaluation and 
criticism of reasoning” (MacFarlane 2009: 2). In other words, general 
logicist thesis proclaims that logic (it needn’t be classical logic, even 
not one of the necessarily truth preserving kind of logic) has a decisive 
normative role for reasoning.
In §2 the paper starts with some remarks on reasoning, particularly 
concerning the difference between deductive reasoning and deductive 
logic. This difference certainly justifi es Harman’s denying the norma-
tive role of logic for reasoning. Nevertheless, a number of philosophers 
have recently put forward their versions of normativity of logic op-
posing Harman’s view. Let me mention some of them: J. MacFarlane 
(2004), Hartry Field (2009), Peter Milne (2009), Caterina Dutilh Naves 
(2013, 2015). They want to answer Harman’s challenges articulating 
what I call logicist thesis in the form of different versions of bridge prin-
ciple, a principle that is supposed to contribute to solving the problem 
of incongruence between descriptive nature of logic and normativity of 
reasoning. The paper discuses in some detail John MacFarlane’s (2004) 
and Hartry Field’s (2009) variants of “bridge principle”. They both take 
for granted that on the one side of the bridge there is a particular valid 
logical form (MacFarlane takes it to be classical logical validity while 
Field allowed different kinds of logical validity) and on the other one, 
more or less uniform, deductive behaviour that is to be normatively 
captured by proposed formalism. However, contrary to them, I’m pro-
posing the picture of deductive reasoning that manifests itself in differ-
ent forms, each of which can be modelled by a different logic.
In §3 the concept of normativity will be considered. I will tackle the 
general question of the role of normativity in researching reasoning 
and in more details the issues of the scope of applicability of normative 
rules and of the ways in which the normative impact of logical rules on 
reasoning can be understood. Concerning the fi rst issue, I’m embracing 
the view that norms can be applicable to those who apprehend them, 
while regarding the second issue I advocate the view that logic can be 
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normative in a stronger sense, as a guidance for reasoning. It contests 
the thesis promoted by Ferrari and Moruzzi (2017) that only the weak-
er sense of normativity can have the normative role in logic, claiming 
that normative rules are mere criteria of correctness.
My proposal, in §4, concerning MacFarlane’s and Field’s Bridge prin-
ciples is that more than one logical formalism can be normatively suit-
able for deductive reasoning due to the fact that reasoning can assume 
different forms that are guided by different goals. Namely, reasoning 
shows up in a variety of forms. It arises in everyday argumentations 
and debates aiming at a kind of shared agreement, but also appears 
in other contexts such as juridical debates or in scientifi c, philosophi-
cal, even mathematical dialogues. In each of these contexts reasoning 
might have different goals. The goal of proving the theorem is different 
from the goal to show that an accused is guilty beyond any reasonable 
doubt, which is, again, different from the goal to make understand one 
that the bus will start from platform 1 when it is so stated in timetable 
and no other information is available. Each of these reasoning forms 
can be captured by suitable logics.
Let me now indicate what I mean by a form of reasoning. It is an 
inference form that is relevant for a particular real-life situation in the 
sense that this form is just suffi cient for achieving a particular goal. As 
Varga, Stenning, Martignon, (2015: 1) put it, ”computational effi ciency 
is an opportunity cost of expressive power”. This form of reasoning is 
normatively justifi ed if this form can be connected with a kind of valid-
ity that the thinker can apprehend or recognize as valid. 
2. Remarks on reasoning 
and Harman’s objections to normative role of logic
a) Deductive reasoning and deductive logic
By deductive reasoning I mean a process of reasoning that guarantees 
a transition of the truth from a set of propositions, believed or known 
by the agent, to the conclusion. Let me illustrate the process by an ex-
ample of a reasoner who, from the beliefs:  
 The 8 am bus from Rijeka to Zagreb starts either from platform 1 
or from platform 2,
 The bus does not start from the platform 2,
infers to the conclusion
 Therefore, it starts from platform 1.
This piece of reasoning is a subject to assessment. It is a correct reason-
ing. Talking about correctness or goodness of the episode of reasoning 
we inevitably invoke the normativity dimension (consider either as the 
fi rst or as the third person perspective) of reasoning. However, as it is 
well known, normativity, particularly normativity of deductive reason-
ing, is a highly contentious topic. We will briefl y tackle some of the 
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issues. The fi rst one is the relation between deductive reasoning and 
deductive logic. To say that deductive reasoning preserves the truth in 
inferring from the premises to the conclusion is to indicate, in one way 
or the other, that the normative standard for deductive reasoning is de-
ductive logic. By deductive logic many logicians and psychologists mean 
a logical calculus that necessarily preserves the truth, notably, classical 
predicate logic2 (CPL, henceforth). CPL by defi nition is extensional and 
truth-functional. Valid reasoning in this sense is represented by the 
argument in which conclusion is a logical consequence of its premises 
expressed as: if all its premises are true, conclusion can’t be untrue.3 
Deductive reasoning that as valid is determined by basic properties of 
classical logic: monotonicity and necessarily truth preservation.
In accord with this line of thinking, deductive reasoning in natural 
language is deductively valid if it can be correctly translated into an 
argument that is semantically valid in a formal system (notably, CPL). 
We can consider this formulation as a standard view of deductive rea-
soning. This view presupposes two things:  it equated the deductive 
reasoning with deductive logic, and further, it equated logical validity 
with the necessarily truth preservation.
The problem with the view that deductive reasoning is equal to 
deductive logic (that implies that the notion of logical consequence is 
CPL notion) is that reasoning performed in natural language is not 
syntactically or extensionally valid but at best intentional (semanti-
cally valid). Reasoning in natural language, in contrast to an argument 
form expressed in formal language, is sensitive to propositional content 
that should be interpreted in connection to the real world. In this in-
terpretation people’s knowledge of the world and evidence they have 
play an important role in their reasoning (what is irrelevant in the 
formalized classically valid argument). The real-life reasoning in natu-
ral language, therefore, hardly satisfi es properties of deductive logic. 
The inferences performed in this domain are hardly necessarily truth 
preserving. Even more, they are often non-monotonic.
Having formulated the difference between reasoning and logic, the 
crucial issue of the paper becomes visible, namely, can we, in spite of 
the described characteristics, consider everyday reasoning as deduc-
tive? Many would say that, in so far, if it is not classically logically 
valid it is not deductive either. We are here faced with the dilemma: 
either real-life reasoning is not deductive, or deductive reasoning is to 
be weakened and broadened in a sense.
2 Due to the limitation of the paper I’m neglecting the view held by in no way 
marginal number of logicians that see intuitionistic logic in the position of the logic 
that necessarily preserves truth.
3 According to Tarski, logical consequence should be understood in terms of 
necessarily truth-preservation (Tarski 1956: 411), which, in turn, can be sharpened 
model-theoretically as follows: a sentence p follows logically from a set of sentences 
S just in case every model of S is a model of p (Tarski 1965: 417).
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Deductive reasoning can be weakened so that it can be modelled by 
formal systems, other than CPL that possibly suits better real-life rea-
soning’s salient characteristics. Here is one of those characteristics: it 
is often the case that real-life inferences are not classically valid, in the 
sense that if all premises are certain, so is the conclusion, but instead, 
(at least) some premises are probable in a various degree. Suppose, as 
Hayek (Hayek 2001) invites us to suppose, “that we want the probabil-
ity of a conclusion of a given valid argument to be above a particular 
threshold”. The answer to this question can be given through probability 
logic that is “the study of the transmission (or lack thereof) of probabil-
ity through inferences” (Hayek 2001).4 In this logic the traditional con-
cern with the truth of premises is replaced with the concern about their 
probabilities. Such logic is certainly deductive, although non-monotonic 
(initially assigned degree of probability to the conclusion may later be 
retracted in the face of a new evidence) and not strictly truth-functional.
The other salient characteristic is that in everyday situations a 
conclusion from a given set of premises is often reached defeasibly. It 
means that the real-life reasoner reserves the possibility to retract from 
the originally reached conclusion in the light of new information or 
adding a new proposition to the original set of premises. This charac-
teristic can be modelled by different variants of default logic.
Coming back to our dilemma, Gilbert Harman, supposing that de-
ductive logic is equal to classical logic, is the leading authority of the 
view that reasoning does not correspond to deductive logic. In so far 
they are distinct. Logicists hold a different stance.
b) Harman’s objections to normative role of logic 
Let me outline the alleged difference between the descriptivism of logic 
on one side and the normativity of reasoning, on the other, posed by G. 
Harman (1986). According to this, logic merely describes logical rela-
tions; it does not prescribe what we should believe. For example, logi-
cians describe an argument as a valid saying that it is impossible for 
the premises to be true without the conclusion to be true. Their main 
interest is in the relation between propositions and in what follows 
from what. There is nothing normative in this claim. 
In a nutshell, Harman’s reasons for divorcing logic from reasoning are:
 Objection from belief revision: claims about logical validity are 
not explicitly normative in their content. They do not tell us 
what we should believe. If, for example, one believes p and be-
lieves p implies q and recognizes them to jointly entail q, one is 
not under any particular normative obligation to believe q (for 
instance, if q is at odds with one’s other beliefs, it would be un-
reasonable to accept q).
4 In his article Hayek (2001) presents the general features of Adams’ probability 
logic (1998), although other systems of probability logic are at stake.
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 Clutter avoidance: There is a worry about “clutter avoidance” 
(is one really obliged to believe all of the infi nitely many trivial 
logical consequences of one’s beliefs?).
 Excessive demands: Norms of logic (might be) so demanding that 
no human being could possibly satisfy them. Namely, due to the 
limitations of cognitive resources and computational powers, no 
one can believe all consequences of his beliefs.
The normative claim, in contrast to merely logically descriptive one, 
has to do with thinkers (actual or potential) that perform the infer-
ences, with the goals their reasoning process aimed to and with the 
doxastic states engaged in the process. The normative counterpart of 
the above descriptive example might be expressed in this way: in order 
to be rational, a reasoner (actual or potential) should, if she believes (or 
accepts) a set of propositions and believes that the conclusion follows 
from the premises, believe or accept the conclusion. At any rate, there 
is a signifi cant difference between the rules of logic (or logics) and its 
normative counterpart. The normative claim, in contrast to descriptive 




In spite of the mentioned difference between logic and reasoning, in 
everyday reasoning processes reasoners tend to preserve the truth of 
the premises in the conclusion (although the truth preservation need 
not be necessary, as we will see in Field’s formulation), and hence to 
obtain the deductive character of the informal reasoning. The logicists, 
in order to meet Harman’s challenges, aimed to connect the formal logi-
cal consequence (or validity or implication relation) with the informal 
understanding of consequence in the way that formal consequence can 
be normative for informal reasoning. 
The logicists hold that logical validity on one side and how we ought 
to think, on the other, should and can be connected. In this sense Mac-
Farlane says: 
Why do we bother studying this notion (validity) at all? Surely it is because 
we think there is some connection between logical validity and the evalua-
tion and criticism of reasoning. If we could get clearer about this connection, 
we could transpose questions about logical validity into questions about 
how we ought to think. (MacFarlane 2004: 2) 
To meet Harman’s challenge John MacFarlane has meticulously pro-
posed the way to establish a connection articulated as a bridge prin-
ciple able to override the gap between logical system that is descrip-
tive and the normativity of reasoning (2004). Its goal is to “transpose 
questions about logical validity into questions about how we ought to 
think” (MacFarlane 2004: 2). Just to indicate the idea, the bridge prin-
ciple (BP) is a material conditional that connects a valid logical form, 
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say: A, B (as antecedent) and a normative claim that is compound of 
thinker’s doxastic states (S believe, S knows) and deontic operators as 
should, is permit to or has a reason (as consequent). The conditional 
asserts that, if there is a valid logical form then comes the normative 
claim: (for instance) if S believe that P1, …, Pn together imply Q, then 
S ought to believe that Q. Formally: ‘If P1, …, Pn ⊨ Q, then Φ’ where 
Φ is a normative principle. MacFarlane’s general strategy is to hold 
fi xed classical logical formulation of validity as antecedent and com-
bine elements in normative claim (consequent) in order to get the most 
”natural” and ”realistic” combination of the mentioned parameters, for 
which the classical validity can play a normative role, avoiding in this 
way Harman’s objections.
To obtain this, MacFarlane combines various types of deontic opera-
tors (strict obligation, permission or defeasible reasons for belief), the 
scope of the deontic operator in the conditional (narrow or wide: does 
deontic operator govern the consequent of the conditional, both the an-
tecedent and the consequent or the whole conditional?) and doxastic 
states (believing and knowing).
Let me present in somewhat systematic way the parameters used in 




(dr) Defeasible (pro tanto) reason.
(2) Polarity
(+) Positive (o), (m) or (dr)
(–) Negative (o), (m) or (dr)
(3) Scope of the deontic operator—e.g. ‘o’ denoting ‘ought’ 
Narrow scope: (n)    (if P, then o (Q))
Wide scope:   (w)     o (if P, then (Q))
Governing both the antecedent and the consequent of the conditional: 
(b) o (if P, then o (Q)).
To complete the parameters the doxastic states of the subject are to 
be added. Namely, doxastic restrictions can be imposed on the anteced-
ent part of the principle, in the sense that subject knows, apprehends 
or recognizes that particular form is logically valid. If such restriction 
is imposed the principle takes subjective or internal reading, contrary 
to objective reading when such restriction is not imposed. Although 
the combination of all parameter settings gives 36 bridge principles in 
total, I will illustrate MacFarlane’s idea with four examples using only 
‘ought’ operator, positive polarity, narrow and wide scope and doxastic 
state “know”.
 (Narrow scope):   If A, B ⊨ C, then if you believe A and you 
believe B, you ought to believe C.
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 (Narrow scope + ‘know’): If you know that A, B ⊨ C, then if you 
believe A and you believe B, you ought do believe C.
 (Wide scope): If A, B ⊨ C, then you ought, if you believe A and 
you believe B, you believe C.
 (Wide scope + ‘know’): If you know that A, B ⊨ C, then you ought, 
if you believe A and you believe B, you believe C.
MacFarlane chose wide scope + ‘know’ formulation as the appropriate 
form for the normative claim. Nevertheless, his fi nal decision for BP 
slightly changes the above formulations giving to BP an even stronger 
subjective reading. He takes the logically valid schema instead of clas-
sical logical consequence to fi gure in the position of the antecedent. The 
stronger subjective or internal note is given in the formulation that the 
subject knows that schema S is valid and, furthermore, the subject ap-
prehends the given inference as an instance of S. The formulation is:
If [you know that] the schema S is formally valid and you apprehend the 
inference A, B / C as an instance of S, then (normative claim about believing 
A, B, and C). (MacFarlane 2004: 22)
Eventually, MacFarlane gives the fi nal form to BP, which I will take as 
his defi nite stance:
If schema S is formally valid and you apprehend the inference A, B / C as an 
instance of S, then you ought to see to it that if you believe A and you believe 
B, you believe C. (MacFarlane 2004: 24)
Hartry Field’s variant of BP
In (Field 2009) Hartry Field developed his view on normativity of logic 
and offered his variant of BP. Unlike MacFarlane, he introduces de-
grees of beliefs expressed in the notion of probabilities, as doxastic 
units, instead of full beliefs. On the other side, similar to MacFarlane, 
he gives a subjective reading to the formulation of BP. Let’s take a 
closer look at his variant of BP:
If it’s obvious that A1, ..., An together entail B, then one ought to impose the 
constraint that P(B) is to be at least P(A1)+ ... +P(An)−(n−1), in any circum-
stance where A1, ..., An and B are in question. (Field 2009: 259)
Subjective reading is evident in the formulation “if it is obvious”, where 
obvious is to be understood as agent-relative. Obviousness as a doxastic 
restriction on the implication relation “A1, ..., An together entail B” is 
equivalent to MacFarlane’s use of the notion of subject’s “apprehen-
sion” that the inference is an instance of the schema. Again, in con-
trast to MacFarlane, the relation “A1, ..., An obviously together entail 
B” is not understood exclusively as a classical logical relation (material 
implication).5 Field allows here the pluralistic reading. He says:
5 It is not clear whether MacFarlane himself persists on material implication in 
his fi nal formulation. It is the fact that at the certain point in his paper he changes 
the notation and A, B ⊨ C replaces with A, B / C that indicate that the relation is 
weaker than the material conditional.
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“Whatever logic is assumed correct, it seems to me that
if B is obviously entailed by A in that logic, a proponent of that logic should 
believe B to at least as high degree as A”
Let me stay a bit longer at Field’s understanding of the relation “A1, ..., 
An together entail B”. We already see that the entailment relation or, 
if you prefer, the consequence relation, need not be classical since the 
plurality of logic is allowed. As the necessary truth preservation (NTP) 
is a substantial feature of the classical logical consequence, does Field 
allow a consequence relation that is not NTP? As a matter of fact, one 
of Field’s important claims is that the relation of logical consequence is 
not the relation of the necessary truth preservation. In his own word-
ing:
I’m inclined to state my conclusion by saying that the validity of a rule does 
not require that it generally preserve truth. However, some may think that 
this simply violates the meaning of the term ‘valid’: ‘valid’, they may say, 
simply means ‘necessarily preserves truth’, or ‘necessarily preserves truth 
in virtue of logical form’…” (Field 2009: 266)
Instead of defi ning validity in terms of NTP, he proposes:
Perhaps we should redefi ne validity, not as (necessarily) preserving truth 
in general but as (necessarily) doing so ‘when it matters’? (Field 2009: 266).
And fi nally:
I basically said that a rule ‘preserves truth when it matters’ if it preserves 
truth when applied to premises that can be established or are rationally 
believable. (Field 2009:  266)
Comparing two variants of BP, MacFarlane’s and Field’s, I would say 
that both of them successfully connect the formal logical consequence 
with its informal understanding in reasoning, providing in this way 
the normative standard for reasoning. Still I take that Field’s variant 
suits my purposes better. MacFarlane’s formulation of normative rules 
requires from the agent to make only those inferences that he appre-
hends as instances of the valid schema. Still, determining a schema as 
classically valid, MacFarlane requires that it necessarily preserve the 
truth. In so far, normatively correct inferences are those that are neces-
sarily truth preserving. Field’s variant of BP is more liberal, allowing 
the implication (consequence) relation that is not necessarily truth pre-
serving, which is much closer to the real-world reasoning that tends to 
preserve the truth but usually only “when it matters”.
This line of thinking fi ts well with my proposal claiming that more 
than one logical formalism can be normatively suitable for deductive 
reasoning. The idea is that people in real-life situations perform dif-
ferent forms of reasoning, each form guided by a different goal. Being 
engaged in various forms, accomplishing different goals, they can be 
normatively warranted from the viewpoint of different logics.
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3. Normativity of reasoning 
In so far we have been discussing the normative role of logic in reason-
ing. In this relatively short part of the paper we will fi rst make a brief 
remark on the general question of the role of normativity in reasoning 
(whether expressed in logical rules or somehow differently). After that, 
we are going to discuss two important issues concerning normativity. 
The fi rst one regards the scope or domain to which normative rules can 
be applicable, while the second one considers different ways in which 
rules of logic can be normative.
Concerning the fi rst question of the place and role of normativity 
in examining reasoning, there is a tendency in recent writings to thor-
oughly eliminate the role of normativity in investigating reasoning. It 
is in this vein that Elquayam and Evans (2011) advocate the idea of 
a complete abandoning of normativity in the psychological scientifi c 
practice. As it is hard to see good reasons for such a claim6, I am start-
ing from the opposite view. Concerning the role of normativity in rea-
soning, the claim is that the very concepts of reasoning, argument and 
argumentation are entirely normative. This is obvious in the scientifi c 
fi eld as well as in the everyday social intercourse. In all kinds of dis-
course people are prone to recognizing a chain of reasoning as a ‘good’ 
one and an argument as a ‘correct’ one. They do this from the fi rst-
person perspective, associating a degree of confi dence to the correctness 
of their judgments and other outcomes of reasoning processes. People 
continually do this also from the third person perspective, assessing 
reasoning of others as correct or incorrect. In empirical investigations 
of reasoning, “without norms of some kind, we cannot interpret the data 
participants produce” (Achourioti,  Fugard, Stenning 2014). Therefore, 
I take for granted the inevitability of normativity in reasoning.
Although the host of issues and open questions concerns the area 
of normativity, we will tackle two of them, namely, what can be the 
domain of application and how to understand that rules are applicable 
to subjects.
The question of domain or scope of applicability can be formulated 
in the following way:
Are normative rules of reasoning applicable universally to the wide 
domain of all rational beings, or are normative rules specifi c, having a 
domain of application only to those who apprehend or understand ap-
plied normative rules? Relative to the latter disjunct, normative rules 
have a restricted application relative to the subject’s apprehension of 
the rule.
Concerning the former understanding of normativity, this approach 
has often been put forward in the traditional but also in the recent 
literature. The problem with this approach is, I hold, in the aprioristic 
6 Due to the tolerable length of the paper, I am not able to support my judgment 
with the extended argumentation as that would deserve a separate paper.
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determination of normative rules and in the generality its nature is 
determined. A typical example of such a consideration is Frege’s claim: 
“Logic prescribes universally how one ought to think if one is to think 
at all” (Frege 1893). In this way, reasoning rules proclaimed as norma-
tive are quite general logical principles that are understood as belong-
ing to CPL (for example: reasoning ought to be consistent). At the same 
time, it is this understanding of normativity that underlines Harman’s 
objections regarding the connection between logic and reasoning. On 
the other side, normativity as restricted to the subject’s apprehension 
seems to be at the basis of MacFarlane’s and Field’s approaches. I’m 
siding with this latter, narrow or restricted, view.
The second question concerns the possible ways in which logic can 
be normative for reasoning. Recently, Florian Steinberger (Forthcom-
ing) distinguished three ways in which this question can be understood. 
According to the fi rst one, normative rules are supposed to prescribe 
directives for reasoning in the sense that they have a guiding role (from 
the subject’s, fi rst person, perspective) in deciding what to believe.
According to the second one, they are supposed to give the criteria 
or standards for the evaluation of the good reasoning (from the third 
person perspective).
Finally, normative rules might play a role of the third personal ap-
praisals by which one can blame or praise an agent for her inferential 
conduct.
For the purposes of this paper it is suffi cient to consider only the 
fi rst two roles the normative rules can play; let me call them directive 
and evaluating roles. Assigning the directive role to normative rules for 
reasoning one understands normativity in a stronger sense than taking 
it to have only evaluative role. If normativity is directive it is in prin-
ciple also evaluative, while the evaluative role does not imply the direc-
tive one. It seems that Harman had in mind the directive role of logic 
for reasoning when he denied its normative infl uence. Accordingly, in 
order to defend the normativity thesis against Harman’s objections, the 
strong, directive meaning of normativity has to be embraced. 
Summing up the discussion in this chapter and putting together the 
questions of scope and of ways of understanding normativity, among 
the possible answers to these questions I’m picking up the restricted, 
apprehensive scope of rules’ application and the directive, guiding role 
of normative rules. They together determine the desiderata, for, I hope, 
a promising way to uphold my view of normativity that is going to be 
exposed in §4.
4. Forms and norms of reasoning
The goal of the normativity thesis I’m supporting is to uphold a tighter 
connection between the normativity expressed in logical formal rules 
and the pre-theoretic comprehension of logical principles used in actual 
reasoning. MacFarlane and Field have been formulating variants of 
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bridge principle that have in common the subjective, restricted under-
standing of rules applicability. I take it to be the signifi cant desidera-
tum of normativity to which I’m adding the directive role of normativ-
ity. These two desiderata of normativity, to which I will refer thereof as 
to restrictiveness, and to directiveness, can make possible a promising 
step forward in this direction. Restrictiveness and directiveness are ob-
viously connected. Logical rules can have a guiding role for those who 
are able to apprehend them in a certain sense. Expressing the same 
thing in different way, we can say that only those who have the rule 
represented in explicit or implicit way can follow a rule. Otherwise, 
the agent’s inferential behaviour can be only evaluated from the third 
person perspective.
Starting from restrictiveness, it is an open question in what sense 
the apprehension of logical rules is to be understood. The view that ap-
prehension should be understood as an explicit mastering of the rule 
is clearly over-demanding and should be, therefore, ruled out as a can-
didate. As a promising approach to the answer I take MacFarlane’s 
stance that to apprehend an inference is to see it as having a certain 
logical structure. But he claims more than that. He claims that: 
On this view, all logical norms have their source in the thinker’s “apprehen-
sion” of inferences as having a certain formal structure. (MacFarlane 2004: 22)
And in clarifying in what sense apprehension is to be understood, he 
says:
My own view is that apprehension should not be intellectualized to the ex-
tent that it requires a completely explicit understanding of what an infer-
ence schema is, the kind one would get from an encyclopedia article on the 
subject. It is something more basic than that. But it is important that ap-
prehension be something for which one can take responsibility and give or 
receive criticism. (MacFarlane 2004: 22).
I’m in accordance with this view on apprehension. Still, it is notewor-
thy to make some caveats regarding this formulation. Let me start with 
taking responsibility and giving or receiving criticism. This formulation 
seems to mark what it means that apprehension is more basic than 
explicit understanding. According to this, one apprehends an inference 
as an instance of inference schema (IS) if one is responsible in the sense 
that one intends to infer according to IS. One is responsible in this 
sense for all and only episodes of reasoning that she apprehends as 
belonging to IS. It goes without ado that IS itself should be valid. But 
let’s note that agent’s apprehension has no role in recognizing an IS 
as valid. Although it is not quite clear whether MacFarlane considers 
the validity of IS independent of agent’s apprehension, it seems as he 
holds that IS’s validity is fi xed as necessarily truth preserving (NTP). 
Accordingly, an agent is normatively responsible for an instance of in-
ference if she apprehends that it belongs to IS, but the kind of required 
validity for IS is fi xed as NTP. Let me call this approach apprehension 
plus fi xed IS.
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Although it is supposed that this approach can challenge Harman’s 
objections, it seems that it can’t meet all of them. It is particularly vul-
nerable to objection to belief revision. Let me use for illustration the ex-
ample from §2. Here we had a reasoner who, looking at the timetable, 
comes to know that:
1. The 8 am bus from Rijeka to Zagreb starts either from platform 
1 or from platform 2,
2. The bus does not start from the platform 2,
and from that she infers to the conclusion
3. Therefore, it starts from the platform 1.
Let’s remind that this is an instance of the real-life reasoning where 
premises sometimes can’t be taken with absolute certainty (reasoning in 
uncertainty) or a new evidence can produce the contradiction, for exam-
ple, the added information that platform 1 is at the moment unavailable. 
In this case, the agent is faced with contradictory beliefs. If we are trying 
to model her reasoning in the frame of classical logic, the reasoning is 
valid even when the reasoner makes whatever conclusion (in accord with 
the principle ex falso quodlibet). Harman takes such a situation as an 
evidence for separating logic from reasoning (Harman 1986). When new 
information is added, our agent is forced to abandon her premise 1, but 
in this case logic does not guide or even recommend any action.
Coming back to MacFarlane BP, when validity of IS is equated with 
the necessary truth preservation, the apprehension plus fi xed IS can’t 
solve the problem. But, if we consider other kinds of validity grounded 
in different logics, including non-monotonic ones (notably probabilistic 
and default logics) that better suit the real-life reasoning, the solution 
seems to be more probable. The employment of a particular kind of de-
fault logic could be especially suitable in our example. Varga, Stenning, 
and Martignon (2015) have proposed closed world semantics, which is 
a variant of default logic. Closed world assumption provides a valid, 
truth-preserving inference that is represented with this conditional 
(Varga, Stenning, and Martignon 2015:  3):
 p & ~abq
meaning: If p and nothing abnormal is the case, then q.
In the situation as the above mentioned, an agent can apprehend: 
p & ~abq as a valid inference schema and in addition apprehend the 
episode of reasoning:
 The 8 am bus from Rijeka to Zagreb starts either from platform 1 
or from platform 2,
 The bus does not start from the platform 2,
 Therefore, it starts from the platform 1,
as an instance of this schema.
This consideration nicely fi ts Field’s proposal of the BP as closer to the 
solution we are looking for. This approach is more liberal than MacFar-
lane’s in regard to the possible kinds of validity of inference. Allowing 
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the plurality of logics,7 Field’s proposal makes it possible to model also 
those forms of real-life reasoning that fall outside the scope of neces-
sarily truth preserving arguments. Particularly it is possible with rea-
soning in uncertainty (can be modeled by probabilistic logic) and with 
defeasible reasoning (can be modeled by default logic).
The proposal of apprehension of both the validity of IS and the va-
lidity of instance of reasoning as belonging to apprehended kind of va-
lidity corresponds to the view of reasoning appearing in different forms 
of reasoning. Reasoning as a cognitive activity is not a uniform en-
deavor and it can’t be idealized as having a closed list of characteristics 
and normative constraints. On the contrary, as it is indicated above, 
people in real-life situations perform different forms of reasoning, each 
form guided by a different goal. Being engaged in various forms, ac-
complishing different goals, they can be normatively warranted from 
the viewpoint of different logics.
The relevance principle tells us that people economize with their 
cognitive resources. As Varga, Stenning and Martignon put it “com-
putational effi ciency is an opportunity cost of expressive power” (2015: 
1). There are some goals a thinker can obtain mobilizing mostly his 
implicit deductive inferential performance, while for other goals the 
explicit, refl ective thinking will be necessary. The goal of proving the 
theorem is different from and requires different cognitive effort than 
the goal to show that an accused is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt, 
which is, again, different from the goal to make understand one that 
the bus will start from platform 1 when it is so stated in timetable and 
no other information is available. Each of these reasoning forms can be 
captured by suitable logics.
However, for any form and goal of deductive reasoning there is an 
adequate normative system that can direct this reasoning toward the 
“rational” achievement of the goal. Which kind of logic is to be em-
ployed as normatively relevant for a particular form of reasoning is 
partly an empirical question. I am proposing the approach to the nor-
7 The idea of the plurality of logic I have in mind is quite close to Beall and 
Restall’s theory (2006). They consider any logic whose notion of validity satisfi es 
what they call Generalized Tarski thesis, GTT.
GTT: “An argument is validX in every caseX in which the premises are true, so is 
the conclusion.”
Variable x ranges over types of cases. Shapiro (2014) clarify the relation of logics, 
validity and cases as follows:
“Classical logic results from GTT if ‘cases’ are Taskian models; intuitionistic 
logic results if  ‘cases’ are constructions or stages in constructions (i.e., nodes 
in Kripke structures); and various relevant and paraconsistent logics results if 
‘cases’ are situations (of a particular sort). In present terms, then, Beall and 
Restall take logical consequence to be folk-relative to kinds of cases. In their 
view, for example, the low of excluded middle is valid relative to Taskian models, 
invalid relative to construction stages (Kripke models); and the argument of ex 
falso quodlibet is valid relative to Tarskian models (and possible worlds), invalid 
relative to situations.” (Shapiro 2014: 33).
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mativity looking at different logical formalisms on the one side and on 
the other the actual human reasoning behaviour, adjusting one to the 
other through a kind of refl exive equilibrium.
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